We characterize the optimal regulatory policy to promote demand response in the electricity sector. Demand response arises when consumers reduce their purchases of electricity in times of peak demand, when the utility's marginal cost of supplying electricity is relatively high. The optimal policy di¤ers systematically from the policy in the U. S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) Order 745. Under plausible conditions, implementation of the FERC's policy can reduce welfare well below the level secured by the optimal demand response policy.
Introduction
The cost of supplying electricity can vary substantially from day to day and even from hour to hour. This is the case because generating units with relatively high operating costs often must be called upon to produce electricity during times of peak demand. In contrast to the ever-changing cost of supplying electricity, the retail price of electricity typically varies little, if at all, for long periods of time. Such time-invariant pricing re ‡ects historic di¢ -culty in measuring the precise time at which electricity is consumed and ongoing consumer resistance to time-sensitive pricing now that smart meters render such pricing feasible.
To help overcome the ine¢ ciencies that arise when the retail price of electricity diverges substantially from the marginal cost of supplying electricity (Borenstein and Holland, 2005; Joskow and Tirole, 2007) , U.S. regulators have, at the urging of Congress, implemented demand response policies.
1;2 In essence, demand response policies compensate electricity customers for reducing their purchases of electricity below historic norms during periods of peak electricity demand. Of central concern in the design of demand response policies is the compensation that is provided to consumers who reduce their electricity consumption.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)'s Order 745 concludes that compensation for reduced electricity consumption should re ‡ect the utility's marginal cost of supplying electricity. 3 Although such marginal-cost compensation may seem natural, many industry experts argue that it is overly generous and will induce excessive demand response.
In particular, experts suggest that the unit compensation for demand response should be set equal to the di¤erence between the utility's marginal cost of supplying electricity and the prevailing unit retail price of electricity. 4 The reduced compensation for demand response e¤ectively imposes on consumers the cost of purchasing electricity from the utility before allowing them to re-sell the electricity to the utility at a price equal to the utility's marginal cost of supply.
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Although the arguments presented by the industry experts are compelling, the arguments have not been accompanied by a fully-speci…ed, formal model of the relevant economic environment. We provide such a model and employ it to characterize the optimal regulatory policy.
Our model provides substantial support for the experts'conclusions. We identify plausible conditions under which the optimal unit compensation for demand response is precisely the level recommended by the experts. In general, however, the optimal rate of compensation can di¤er from this level. A di¤erent rate of compensation is optimal, for example, when electricity production entails social losses from externalities, as it typically does in practice.
An alternative rate of compensation also is optimal when society values asymmetrically the welfare of di¤erent consumer groups, e.g., consumers who can readily replace demand response with on-site generation of electricity and consumers who lack this capability.
Industry experts also have suggested that a demand response policy will play no useful role when retail prices can adjust rapidly to re ‡ect the prevailing marginal cost of supplying electricity. 6 Our formal analysis of this issue again provides considerable support for the 4 For example, Chao (2011, p. 78 ) concludes that "the optimal level of demand-response payment ... equals the di¤erence between the wholesale price and the [retail rate] RR." Bushnell et al. (2009 ), Hogan (2009 , Borlick (2010) , Chao (2010) , and Borlick et al. (2012) , among others, o¤er corresponding conclusions. 5 Borlick et al. (2012, p. 2) advise that "Retail customers that reduce their consumption should not be paid as if they generated the electricity they merely declined to buy. Instead, retail customers should be compensated as if they had entered into a long-term contract to purchase electricity at their retail rate but instead, during a peak demand period, resold the electricity to others at the market rate ... Simply put, the customer must be treated as if it had …rst purchased the power it wishes to resell to the market." 6 To illustrate, Chao (2011, p. 79) observes that in "the special case where the [retail price of electricity] equals the wholesale price, the optimal demand response payment would be zero. Therefore, for consumers on dynamic retail pricing, there is no longer any reason to pay them for demand reduction." Chen et al. (2010) experts'conclusion, but identi…es conditions under which an optimally-designed demand response policy can enhance welfare even in the absence of any restrictions on retail prices. The incremental value of a demand response policy in this setting arises because the prevailing retail price a¤ects consumption by all consumers whereas the prevailing compensation for demand response only a¤ects the actions of consumers who provide demand response. The ability to di¤erentially a¤ect the behavior of a subset of consumers can be valuable when consumers employ di¤erent technologies for on-site electricity production.
In addition to formally characterizing the optimal demand response policy, we investigate the welfare gains that an optimally designed policy can secure. We also examine the welfare losses that can arise when the FERC's marginal-cost compensation policy is implemented in place of the optimal policy. We …nd that the welfare gains from an optimal policy can be substantial under plausible conditions, as can the losses from the FERC's policy.
We develop and explain these …ndings as follows. Section 2 reviews the key elements of our model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal regulatory policy in the setting of primary interest where the retail price of electricity does not vary with the realized state of demand for electricity, where there are no distributional concerns, and where consumers cannot in ‡uence the baseline level of electricity consumption above which they are compensated for providing demand response. Section 4 identi…es the changes to the optimal policy that arise when each of these restrictions is relaxed. Section 5 illustrates the welfare gains that an optimally designed demand response policy can secure and the welfare losses that arise when the FERC's marginal-cost compensation policy is implemented in place of the optimal policy. Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for further research. The proofs of all formal conclusions are presented in Appendix A. Appendix B provides both the details of the analysis that underlies the numerical solutions presented in section 5 and additional numerical solutions. and Li et al. (2011) demonstrate the optimality of setting the price of electricity equal to its instantaneous marginal cost of production and propose an iterative algortithm to achieve the optimal outcome in the presence of limited information.
2 Model Elements
A regulated utility produces and delivers electricity to consumers. The utility's cost of producing and delivering X units of electricity is C(X), which is an increasing, convex function (so C 0 (X) > 0 and C 00 (X) 0 for all X > 0). This cost structure re ‡ects the utility's need to employ progressively less e¢ cient generating units as the demand for electricity increases above the utility's baseload capacity.
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Consumer i 2 f1; :::; N g derives value V i (x i ; ) from consuming x i units of electricity in state . V i ( ) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function of x i in each state. Furthermore, each consumer's total and marginal valuation of electricity increases with the state (so Every consumer can purchase electricity from the regulated supplier. Some consumers also can produce their own electricity using either a dispatachable on-site generation technology (e.g., natural gas fuel cells) or a non-dispatachable technology (e.g., solar panels). 8 We take as given each consumer's investment in one of these technologies and analyze the consumer's on-site production (and consumption) of electricity. 9 Consumer i's cost of producing 7 In practice, a utility's production costs may increase discontinuously at output levels where less e¢ cient auxiliary generating units are brought on line. We assume C( ) is continuously di¤erentiable for analytic tractability. This assumption does not alter our primary qualitative conclusions. 8 A consumer's choice of on-site production technology might be a¤ected by such factors as his access to …nancing, his projected consumption of electricity, the characteristics of his commercial/residential property (including the rooftop slope and exposure to the sun), and local zoning ordinances, for example. These considerations and others may lead some consumers to refrain from any investment in on-site production capabilities. For expositional ease, we abstract from the possibility that a consumer might invest in multiple distinct production technologies. 9 Each consumer is assumed to consume all of electricity he generates on-site, thereby abstracting from the possibility that a consumer might supply electricity to other consumers or sell electricity to the regulated utility. consumer i has purchased from the utility historically, for example. To focus on the pricing issues of central interest, we assume initially that consumer i perceives x i to be an exogenous parameter, e.g., a baseline level established by the regulator over which the consumer has no control. 12 m( ) denotes the payment a consumer receives from the utility for each unit of demand response he provides in state . Because this compensation for demand response can vary 10 DNV GL (2014) reports that solar capacity represents the major of distributed generation (DG) capacity in eight of the ten U.S. states with the most DG capacity. Combined heat and power units (which employ natural gas as the primary fuel) accounts for the majority of DG capacity in Connecticut and New York. 11 In principle, a consumer might be penalized for purchasing more than the established baseline level of electricity, in which case x d i might be negative. We follow industry practice in abstracting from this possibility. 12 We thereby abstract initially from the possibility that, as in Chao (2009 Chao ( , 2011 and Chao and DePillis (2012) , a consumer's choice of x u i in one period might a¤ect the value of x i that is established in future periods. Section 4 considers the possibility that consumers might be able to in ‡uence their baseline consumption levels.
with the state, it can be set at a relatively high level when is high, for example, to encourage consumers to reduce the amount of electricity they purchase from the utility when the utility's marginal cost of producing electricity is relatively high.
Electricity production can generate social losses from externalities. e i will denote the social loss associated with each unit of electricity that consumer i produces himself. 13 The unit loss can vary across consumers because di¤erent consumers may employ di¤erent technologies to generate electricity. In particular, e i may be zero when consumer i employs the non-dispatchable (e.g., solar) on-site production technology, whereas e i may be strictly positive when the consumer employs a dispatchable (e.g., natural gas fuel cell) technology. e(X)
will denote the total social loss from externalities that arises when the utility produces X units of electricity.
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The regulator chooses her policy instruments f r; R; m( ) g to maximize expected social welfare while ensuring non-negative expected pro…t for the utility. Social welfare is the di¤er-ence between aggregate consumer welfare and the social loss from externalities. 15 Aggregate consumer welfare is the di¤erence between: (i) the sum of the value that all consumers derive from their electricity consumption and the compensation they receive for the demand response they provide; and (ii) the sum of consumers'payments to the utility and the costs consumers incur in producing electricity themselves. Formally, when consumer i produces , aggregate expected consumer welfare is:
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The corresponding expected social loss from externalities is:
where
The utility's expected pro…t is the di¤erence between its expected revenues and its expected costs (which include payments to consumers for the demand response they provide).
Formally:
The regulator's formal problem, denoted [RP] , is to choose r, R, and m( ) to:
where, given r; R, and m( ), consumer i chooses x u i ( ; ) and x o i ( ; ) to:
) will denote the set of 2 [ ; ] realizations for which consumer i provides (does not provide) demand response at the solution to [RP] . 16 To focus on the settings of primary interest, much of the ensuing analysis considers settings where the optimal regulatory policy induces some demand response.
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The timing in the model is the following. First, each consumer's baseline level of electricity purchase from the utility (x i ) is speci…ed. Second, the regulator sets r; R, and m( ).
Third, the state ( ) is realized. Fourth, each consumer determines how much electricity to produce himself on-site and how much to purchase from the utility. Fifth, the utility supplies all of the electricity that consumers demand, receives the associated revenue, and delivers the required payments to consumers for the demand response they provide. 16 Formally,
) is the set of 2 [ ; ] for which
< ( ) r +m( ) at the solution to [RP] . 17 Formally, unless otherwise noted, we assume
The Optimal Demand Response Policy
Before characterizing the optimal regulatory policy, we examine how the unit compensation for demand response, m( ), a¤ects a consumer's actions. Lemma 1 reports that when a consumer is initially purchasing some electricity from the utility, producing some electricity himself using a dispatchable technology, and providing some demand response, the consumer will reduce his purchase from the utility and increase his own production of electricity as m( ) increases. Furthermore, due to the increasing marginal cost of self-generation, the consumer will increase his production of electricity by less than he curtails his purchases from the utility. Consequently, an increase in m( ) induces a reduction in the sum of the consumer's purchase and production of electricity. In contrast, the consumer will always produce the maximum amount of electricity that his on-site non-dispatchable technology permits, so his electricity production and consumption in each state are not a¤ected by the prevailing compensation for demand response.
0. These weak inequalities hold as strict inequalities (equalities) when consumer i employs the dispatchable (non-dispatchable) on-site production technology.
Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2 now identify the key features of the optimal regulatory policy. Corollary 2. If on-site electricity production is prohibitively costly for all consumers, then
Equation (8) in Proposition 1 indicates that the optimal regulatory policy will grant the utility only the minimum expected pro…t required to ensure the utility's operation (i.e.,
. This conclusion re ‡ects the regulator's concern with maximizing consumer welfare. Equation (6) in Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal unit compensation for demand response in terms of the optimal unit retail price of electricity, r (which is speci…ed in equation (7)). The optimal speci…cation of m( ) is best understood by …rst abstracting from the e¤ects of externalities.
Corollary 1 reports that in the absence of social losses from externalities, m( ) is optimally set equal to the di¤erence between the utility's marginal cost of production and r .
This conclusion re ‡ects the fact that to induce each consumer who provides demand response to act so as to maximize welfare, the e¤ective price he faces for consuming electricity supplied by the utility should be equal to the social marginal cost of electricity production by the utility in each state. The e¤ective price a consumer faces is the sum of the nominal retail price of electricity (r) and the unit compensation for demand response (m) the consumer foregoes when he decides to purchase the marginal unit of electricity from the utility rather than increase his demand response. In the absence of social losses from externalities, the social marginal cost of producing electricity is simply the utility's marginal production cost (C 0 ( )).
Therefore, the optimal policy equates r + m( ) and C 0 ( ) by setting m( ) = C 0 (X u ) r.
Corollary 1 supports the critics of the FERC's marginal-cost compensation policy. As the critics note, the FERC's policy e¤ectively awards to consumers the full value of a commodity (i.e., reduced electricity consumption) without …rst requiring them to pay anything for the commodity (since they are not required to purchase electricity at the prevailing retail price before e¤ectively selling it to the utility). Therefore, the FERC's policy induces more than the welfare-maximizing level of demand response, ceteris paribus.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 report that when externalities are present, the optimal unit compensation for demand response is increased above C 0 (X u ) r by the extent to which reduced production by the utility reduces social losses from externalities. In the case where consumers do not produce electricity on-site or where such production does not generate externalities, m( ) is optimally increased by e 0 (X u ), the rate at which social losses from externalities decline as the utility's production of electricity declines. Equation (6) in Proposition 1 reports that, more generally, this increase in m( ) is reduced by the extent to which reduced production by the utility increases social losses from externalities due to increased electricity production by consumers on-site. This adjustment becomes more pronounced as e i increases and as consumers become more likely to replace the electricity they do not purchase from the utility with electricity they produce themselves (i.e., as
Having characterized the optimal regulatory policy, 19 we now consider its e¢ cacy in 18 Recall from Lemma 1 that
0 (X) = e i = e, a constant, for all i = 1; :::; N . Consequently, equation (6) implies that m( ) is optimally increased above C 0 ( ) r when the marginal social loss from externalities is constant and identical for all sources of electricity production. The increase in m( ) serves to reduce social losses from externalities because the increase in the amount of electricity consumers produce on-site as their demand response increases is less than the amount of their demand response.
19 Equation (7) can be written as
the retail price of electricity is optimally set to ensure that an expected weighted average of deviations of price from the utility's marginal cost of production (including relevant externality costs) is zero, after adjusting for losses from externalities associated with on-site production of electricity by consumers. The weights on the deviations are the relevant price-sensitivities of consumer demand for electricity, re ‡ecting standard Ramsey considerations (Joskow and Tirole, 2007 
and
Corollary 3 …rst considers the relatively simple setting where the utility is the only coste¤ective source of electricity.
Corollary 3. Suppose on-site electricity production is prohibitively costly for all consumers.
Then, given the actions of other consumers, the actions of each consumer who provides demand response are e¢ cient at the solution to [RP] . In contrast, the actions of consumers who do not provide demand response generally are not e¢ cient.
Corollary 3 re ‡ects the fact that when consumers do not produce electricity themselves (or when such production generates no externalities), the regulator chooses m( ) to ensure that each consumer who provides demand response delivers the e¢ cient level of demand response in each state. However, because the retail price structure does not vary with the state, the regulator typically cannot induce consumers who do not provide demand response to purchase the e¢ cient level of electricity from the utility in each state.
An additional consideration arises when consumers produce electricity and this production generates losses from externalities. Consumers do not consider these losses when deciding how much electricity to produce. Consequently, because the regulator is not endowed with the ability to impose consumer-speci…c taxes on consumers for the electricity (and externalities) they produce, the regulator cannot induce consumers to produce the e¢ cient levels of electricity, as Corollary 4 reports. 
Extensions
We now examine how the optimal regulatory policy changes when distributional concerns arise, when consumers can in ‡uence their baseline consumption levels, and when retail prices can vary with the realized state.
Distributional Concerns
First consider the possibility that the regulator might value di¤erently the welfare of consumers who can provide demand response and those who cannot. For example, implementation costs may limit participation in a demand response program to large commercial and industrial consumers, and the regulator may be particularly concerned with the welfare of small residential consumers. 21 Let e denote the weight the regulator assigns to the welfare of the e N consumers who can provide demand response, and let e 21 Borlick (2011) notes that the marginal-cost compensation for demand response advised by the FERC requires consumers who do not provide demand response to subsidize those who do. 22 The regulator seeks to maximize the relevant weighted average of the expected welfare of the two types of consumers while ensuring non-negative pro…t for the regulated utility. The proof of Proposition 2 includes a formal statement of [RP-D] .
Proposition 2. At the solution to [RP-D] , given the optimal unit retail price r:
Therefore, if there are no losses from externalities (so e i = 0 for i = 1; :::; N and e(X) = 0 for all X 0):
Proposition 2 provides the intuitive conclusion that, ceteris paribus, the regulator will reduce the compensation for demand response when she values relatively highly the welfare of consumers who cannot provide demand response (i.e., when b > e ). Although the reduced compensation induces less than the (unweighted) surplus-maximizing level of demand response, it permits reductions in the charges (r and R) imposed on consumers who do not provide demand response. Equation (11) indicates that, ceteris paribus, the reduction in m( ) tends to be more pronounced as: (i) b increases, so the regulator values more highly the welfare of consumers who cannot provide demand response; (ii) b N increases, so there are more consumers who cannot provide demand response; (iii)
magnitude of the equilibrium demand response increases; and (iv)
so a reduction in m( ) causes a smaller increase in the demand for electricity from the utility (and an associated smaller increase in the utility's marginal cost of production).
Endogenous Baseline Consumption Levels
Now consider the possibility that consumer i might undertake action a i at personal cost D i (a i ) to increase his baseline consumption level, x i . For example, as Chao (2011) and Chao 23 The argument of C 0 ( ) and e 0 ( ) in the statement of Proposition 2 is the total amount of electricity purchased from the utility.
and DePillis (2012) posit, a consumer might purchase more than the level of electricity that maximizes his contemporary welfare in early periods, recognizing that doing so will increase his baseline consumption level in later periods. 24 We assume x i is an increasing, concave function of a i and D i ( ) is a strictly increasing, strictly convex function for all i = 1; :::; N .
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The regulator …rst speci…es f R; r; m( ) g and the rule that will be employed to establish baseline consumption levels. Consumers then choose their actions to in ‡uence their baseline consumption levels. Finally, consumers determine how much electricity they will purchase from the utility and how much electricity they will produce themselves. The regulator seeks to maximize aggregate expected consumer welfare while ensuring non-negative expected pro…t for the utility. 
It is readily shown that an increase in m( ) induces consumers who provide demand response to devote more e¤ort to increasing their baseline consumption levels (so
for all i = 1; :::; N ) at the solution to [RP-a] .
28 Therefore, the denominator of the fraction in 24 Chao (2011, p. 75) observes that "a customer can arti…cially increase its consumption during "normal" consumption periods to create a higher baseline in order to collect demand reduction payments without actually reducing load." 25 We further assume that, for all i = 1; :::; N , consumer i's expected welfare is a strictly concave function of a i and consumer i chooses a i > 0. 26 Consumer i's welfare now includes both the personal cost of action a i and the impact of this action on x i . 27 The proof of Proposition 3 includes a formal statement of [RP-a] . 28 See the proof of Proposition 3. 14 equation (12) exceeds 1. Consequently, Propositions 1 and 3 indicate that, ceteris paribus, the optimal compensation for demand response is scaled down systematically when consumers can in ‡uence their baseline consumption levels. The reduction in m( ) limits incentives to arti…cially in ‡ate baseline consumption, but leads to distortions where they otherwise would not arise, as Corollary 5 reports.
Corollary 5. Given the actions of other consumers, the actions of a consumer who provides demand response generally are not e¢ cient at the solution to [RP-a] , even if electricity production by consumers generates no social losses from externalities.
State-Speci…c Pricing
In settings where smart meters are deployed ubiquitously, a regulator may be able to set a state-speci…c unit retail price, r( ), in addition to R and m( ). Let [RP-s] denote the regulator's formal problem in such a setting where she seeks to maximize aggregate expected consumer welfare while ensuring non-negative expected pro…t for the utility. Proposition 4 identi…es conditions under which a demand response policy admits no strict welfare gains in this setting. Proposition 4 indicates that when the regulator sets the optimal state-speci…c retail prices for electricity, a demand response policy will not enhance welfare if consumers do not produce electricity on-site or if such production entails no externalities. Under these conditions, the regulator can maximize surplus by setting the retail price of electricity equal to its social marginal cost of production in each state. Consequently, non-zero compensation for demand response would only reduce expected welfare by causing the e¤ective price a consumer pays 15 for electricity purchased from the utility to diverge from the utility's social marginal cost of production.
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The same is true when all consumers provide demand response in every state. In this case, an increase in r( ) has the same impact as an increase in m( ) on each consumer's electricity purchase and production decisions. Consequently, a demand response policy o¤ers no strict welfare gains when the regulator sets the optimal state-speci…c retail prices for electricity.
In contrast, identical changes in r( ) and m( ) do not a¤ect symmetrically the actions of all consumers who produce electricity on-site when only some of them provide demand response. Therefore, as Corollary 6 indicates, the regulator optimally increases m( ) above 0 in states where, relative to corresponding e¤ects on the demand for electricity from the utility, an increase in r( ) increases losses from externalities due to increased electricity production by consumers more rapidly than does an increase in m( ). The increase in m( ) permits a less pronounced increase in electricity (and externality) production by consumers than would an increase in r( ). 
As is the case in other settings, the regulator's inability to impose consumer-speci…c taxes on on-site electricity (and externality) production in the present setting often precludes her from inducing e¢ cient actions, as Corollary 7 reports. Corollary 7 implies that when consumers produce electricity and generate social losses from externalities in doing so, the optimal regulatory policy generally does not induce e¢ cient actions even when the regulator can set state-speci…c retail prices.
Welfare Gains and Losses
We now illustrate the welfare gains that can arise when an optimally designed demand response policy is implemented. We also illustrate the welfare losses that can arise when compensation for demand response is instead set equal to the utility's marginal cost of producing electricity. To do so, we consider the following benchmark setting in which the utility is the only producer of electricity and production entails no losses from externalities.
The utility's cost of producing X units of electricity is C(X) = F + a X + b X 2 , where a, b, and F are nonnegative constants.
There are N H identical "H consumers"and N L identical "L consumers."The former (e.g., non-residential consumers) value electricity more highly than do the latter (e.g., residential consumers). Each i (2 fL; Hg) consumer derives value
i from The utility's …xed cost of production (F ) is taken to be $39; 252; 470. This number re ‡ects the 46% of revenue collected annually from ratepayers in the PJM Interconnection region that is estimated to be employed to cover the …xed costs of installing generation capacity and maintaining and upgrading the region's transmission and distribution network. 37 The 31 PJM Interconnection is the "regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia" (www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx). 32 The temperature data are drawn from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2014).
33 ISO New England is "the independent, not-for-pro…t corporation responsible for keeping electricity ‡owing across the six New England states and ensuring that the region has reliable, competitively priced wholesale electricity" (www.iso-ne.com/about). We investigate potential outcomes in the California, ISO New England, and PJM Interconnection regions because Busnell (2007) provides estimates of the cost parameters a and b in these three regions. We focus on outcomes in the PJM Interconection region in the text for brevity and because this region is the largest and the most populous of the three regions. 34 The data reveal that the distribution of is also approximated reasonably well by a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution with parameters ( , , ) = (18:460, 10:928, 0:029). The key qualitative conclusions reported below are unchanged when this GEV distribution is employed instead of the identi…ed gamma distribution. 35 The optimal regulatory policy in the absence of a demand response policy is characterized in Lemma B1
in Appendix B. 36 This average hourly load, 90,314 megawatts, is total annual consumption (791,152,262 megawatt hours) in the PJM Interconnection region in 2013 divided by 8,760, the number of hours in a year (PJM, 2014). 37 ISO-NE (2006) and Thomas et al. (2014) estimate that variable energy production costs constitute between remaining cost parameters are set at a = 0:0 and b = 0:00045, the parameter values that Bushnell (2007) estimates for this region. Table 1 reports outcomes in this benchmark setting: (i) in the absence of any DR policy (so m( ) = 0 for all ); (ii) under the optimal marginal-cost compensation ("FERC") policy (where m( ) = C 0 ( ) for all ); and (iii) under the optimal DR policy (i.e., at the solution to [RP] ). The …rst two rows of data in Table 1 report the unit price of electricity (r) and the associated …xed charge (R). 38 The third row presents the expected DR com-
The fourth row reports expected peak-load production 
where m = 42:5 is the smallest realization of for which demand response is provided both at the solution to [RP] and under the optimal FERC policy in the benchmark setting. The qualitative conclusions drawn below are robust to alternative plausible de…nitions of peak-load production costs. 40 Formally, E fC 42 The welfare gain re ‡ects in part the 17:6% reduction in expected peak-load production costs the optimal DR policy secures. 43 The cost reductions, in turn, permit a lower unit price for electricity. Consumers also bene…t from the compensation they receive for their demand response, which nearly o¤sets the increase in the …xed charge.
The optimal DR policy increases expected welfare by 13:1% above the level secured under the optimal FERC policy. This welfare increase arises even though the optimal FERC policy reduces expected peak-load production costs by 26:6% below the corresponding costs under the optimal DR policy. The optimal FERC policy reduces electricity consumption excessively, causing the value that consumers derive from consuming electricity to decline by more than the corresponding reduction in production costs.
The welfare gains secured under an optimal DR policy typically increase as the convexity of the utility's cost function increases. The enhanced gains arise because the expected cost savings from curtailing peak-load consumption become more pronounced as the utility's marginal cost increases more rapidly with output. To illustrate this more general conclusion, Table 2 reports the levels of expected welfare that arise as b increases and decreases by 10%, 20%, and 30% above and below its value · (0:00045) in the benchmark setting. 44 The table reveals, for example, that when b increases by 20% (from 0:00045 to 0:00054), the increase in expected welfare secured under the optimal DR policy (relative to the welfare secured in the absence of any DR policy) increases from 17:4% to 23:9%. 45 In contrast, a 20% reduction in 42 Larger percentage increases in expected welfare arise in the settings analyzed in Appendix B.
43 Reported percentage changes may not re ‡ect the entries in Table 1 exactly because these entries are rounded. 44 All other parameter values are held constant at their levels in the benchmark setting. 45 Systematic increases in the marginal cost of production (i.e., increases in a) also enhance the welfare gains generated by an optimal DR policy. To illustrate, suppose a increases from 0 to 20, while all other parameters are held constant at their levels in the benchmark setting. (The average value of a in the settings considered in Appendix B is approximately 23.). The increase in expected welfare that the optimal DR policy generates in this case (relative to no DR policy) rises to 33:6% (from the 17:4% generated in the benchmark setting). Bushnell's (2007) estimate of a = 0 in the PJM region re ‡ects in part substantial supply by nuclear generators. Some of these generators are scheduled for retirement in the near future, b (from 0:00045 to 0:00036) reduces this gain in expected welfare from 17:4% to 15:4%. When the utility's marginal cost of production increases su¢ ciently slowly with output, even an optimally designed FERC policy can reduce welfare below the level achieved in the absence of any DR policy. 46 This conclusion is illustrated in the last two rows of data in Table 2 . These data indicate that when b declines by 20% or 30% below its level in the benchmark setting, the excessive demand reduction the FERC policy induces reduces the value that consumers derive from consuming electricity by more than it reduces peak-load production costs.
Conclusions
We have characterized the optimal demand response policy in several settings, including settings with a …xed retail price for electricity and settings where the retail price can fully which will tend to increase a. However, increased supply of energy from renewable sources may reduce a. 46 A value of b substantially below Bushnell's (2007) estimate might arise, for example, from pronounced reductions in the price of natural gas, which often is employed to power peak-load production units. The U.S. experienced sharp reductions in the price of natural gas between 2007 and 2009 (www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/natural-gas/all/). The ongoing replacement of (low cost) coal generation by natural gas generation in the PJM region can introduce a countervailing e¤ect on b.
re ‡ect the utility's marginal cost of production. Our …ndings generally support industry experts who advocate compensation for demand response that re ‡ects the di¤erence between the utility's marginal cost of supplying electricity and the prevailing retail price of electricity. However, the optimal policy typically entails further adjustments to account for the externalities associated with electricity production. The optimal policy generally is not the marginal-cost compensation policy advocated by the FERC.
We have shown that the optimal demand response policy can secure substantial increases in expected welfare under plausible conditions. The FERC's demand response policy often generates a signi…cantly smaller increase in welfare, and can even reduce welfare below the level that arises in the absence of any demand response policy. Therefore, the expressed concerns about the FERC's policy would seem to merit serious consideration.
Our illustrations of the performance of the optimal demand response policy and the FERC's policy did not account explicitly for losses from externalities associated with electricity production. 47 A full accounting for these losses could alter the relative performance of the FERC's demand response policy. Observe from Proposition 1 that, ceteris paribus, the di¤erence between the marginal compensation under the FERC's policy and the corresponding optimal compensation declines as the marginal social loss from externalities associated with electricity production by the utility increases, after adjusting for relevant social losses from externalities associated with increased electricity production by consumers. Accurate estimation of social losses from externalities requires detailed knowledge of the particular technologies being employed to generate electricity at all relevant output levels. Such estimation and development of the associated implications for the relative performance of di¤erent demand response policies await further research.
In closing, we note four additional extensions of our analysis that merit further research.
47 A utility's marginal cost of supplying electricity can re ‡ect relevant social losses from externalities. This will be the case if the utility (or the competitive suppliers from which the utility procures electricity) faces costs that re ‡ect relevant social losses from externalities. These costs might take the form of emissions taxes or the costs or emission permits, for example. Fabra and Reguant (2014) …nd that a large fraction of emissions costs are passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices for electricity.
First, rather than taking the baseline levels of electricity purchases (x i ) as given, the optimal structuring of these baselines should be analyzed. In practice, regulators likely will want to implement rules for establishing baseline levels that limit strategic manipulation by consumers (Chao, 2011) . Second, consumer investment in on-site production capacity should be endogenized in order to examine the impact of demand response (and other) policies on distributed generation capabilities. Third, additional policy instruments warrant consideration. The optimal design of a demand response policy is best viewed as an element of a broader exercise that includes, for example, the optimal design of distributed generation, energy conservation, and renewable energy portfolio policies. The key qualitative conclusions drawn above seem likely to persist in the context of this more general analysis, but the details of the analysis remain to be determined.
Fourth, the optimal demand response policy should be characterized in settings where the retail price of electricity partially re ‡ects the utility's marginal cost of production, e.g., in the presence of time-of-day pricing. Our …ndings in the settings with a …xed retail price and fully state-speci…c retail pricing (recall Propositions 1 and 4) suggest that the optimal compensation for demand response will continue to re ‡ect di¤erences between the utility's marginal cost of production and the prevailing retail price of electricity. We conjecture that our key qualitative conclusions also will persist in settings with restructured electricity markets, where the utility secures electricity from non-a¢ liated generators. 
Therefore, 
Pointwise optimization of (16) with respect to m( ), using (1), (2), (3), and the envelope theorem provides:
Since the value of R does not a¤ect consumption decisions, di¤erentiating (16) with respect to R, using (1), (2), and (3), provides N + N = 0 ) = 1 . Also, (17) can be written as:
Therefore, (6) 
Further observe that (1) can be written as:
(19) implies that for any b 2
Consequently,
Similarly, from (3):
where e i ( ) 
The established continuity and Leibnitz'rule, along with (2), (20), and (21), ensure that di¤erentiation of (16) with respect to r provides:
Because = 1, (22) can be written as:
From (14), for i = 1; :::; N , (18), for all i = 1; :::; N , for 2 D i :
(23) and (24) imply:
(7) follows directly from (25).
Proof of Corollary 3.
First suppose x (6) and (14) imply that at the solution to [RP] identi…ed in Proposition 1, x u i is determined by:
( 9) and (26) imply that, given the actions of other consumers, the actions of consumer i are e¢ cient. (7) and (14) imply that at the solution to [RP] identi…ed in Proposition 1, x u i is determined by:
(9) and (27) imply that, given the actions of other consumers, the actions of consumer i are e¢ cient if and only if, for all 2 [ ; ]:
The equality in (28) typically will not hold because x u i ( ), and thus X u , vary with .
Proof of Corollary 4.
(14) implies that at the solution to [RP] :
The corollary follows from (9) and (29).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Letting "e " ("b ") denote variables for consumers who can (cannot) provide demand response, expected weighted consumer welfare in this setting is:
The utility's expected pro…t is:
Expected social losses from externalities are:
The regulator's problem, [RP-D] , is to choose f R; r; m( ) g to maximize E f U ( ) g E f L ( ) g while securing non-negative expected pro…t for the utility. Let 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the utility's participation constraint (E f g 0 ).
Then the Lagrangian function associated with [RP-D] is:
Since the value of R does not a¤ect consumption decisions, di¤erentiating (33) with respect to R, using (30), (31), (32), provides:
Since @b x u i ( ) @m( ) = 0 for all i = 1; :::; b N , pointwise optimization of (33) with respect to m( ), using (30), (31), (32), Leibnitz'rule, and the established continuity of consumer welfare and pro…t (recall the proof of Proposition 1) provides:
From (34):
Therefore, (35) can be written as:
Since
, (36) can be written as:
(10) follows immediately from (37) because
Proof of Proposition 3.
(20) implies that aggregate consumer welfare in this setting is:
Since and Leibnitz'rule imply that a i is determined by:
By assumption:
(39) implies:
(39), (40), and (41) imply:
The regulator's problem, [RP-a] , is to choose f R; r; m( ) g to maximize E f U a ( ) g E f L( ) g while securing non-negative expected pro…t for the utility. Let a 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the utility's participation constraint (E f a g 0 ).
Then the Lagrangian function associated with [RP] is:
for j 2 fu; d; og. For the reasons identi…ed in the proof of Proposition 1, expected consumer welfare and the …rm's expected pro…t are both continuous functions of . Consequently, Leibnitz' rule, (2), (21), and (38) imply that pointwise optimization of (43) with respect to m( ) provides:
Since the value of R does not a¤ect consumption decisions, di¤erentiating (43) with respect to R, using (2), (21), and (38), provides N + a N = 0 ) a = 1. Therefore, (44) can be written as:
(18) implies (14) implies that x u i ( ) does not vary with x i , given r and m( ). Therefore:
) dx
(12) follows from (45), (46) , and (47).
Proof of Corollary 5. 
( 9) and (48) imply that, given the actions of other consumers, consumer i's actions are e¢ cient only if:
(47) implies that (49) holds if and only if r = C 0 (X u ) e 0 (X u ) for each 2 [ ; ]. These inequalities typically will not all hold because x u i ( ), and thus X u , vary with .
Proof of Proposition 4.
Expected consumer welfare in this setting is:
The regulator's problem, [RP-s] , is to choose f R; r( ); m( 
Since the value of R does not a¤ect consumption decisions, di¤erentiating (53) with respect to R, using (50), (51), and (52) provides N + s N = 0 ) s = 1 .
Pointwise optimization of (53) with respect to m( ), using (50), (51), (52) and the envelope theorem provides:
Since s = 1, (54) can be written as:
The last equality in (55) holds because
Pointwise optimization of (53) with respect to r( ), using (50), (51), (52) and the envelope theorem provides:
Since s = 1, (56) can be written as:
The last equality in (57) holds because, since
Using (57), (55) can be written as:
. (58) Using (58), (57) can be written as:
Conclusions (i) and (ii) of the proposition follow directly from (58) and (59) because
= 0 when consumers do not produce electricity or when their production entails no externalities. Conclusion (iii) of the proposition follows from (58) and (59) because
, and
and for all i = 1; :::N .
Proof of Corollary 6.
(13) follows immediately from (58) because
0, and
Proof of Corollary 7. 
(9) and (60) imply that, given the actions of other consumers, the actions of consumer i at the identi…ed solution: (i) are e¢ cient if e j = 0 for all j 2 f1; :::; N g; and (ii) are not e¢ cient if e i > 0.
Appendix B. Elements of the Numerical Solutions
This appendix has three sections. The …rst section presents the analytic conclusions that underlie the analysis of the benchmark setting considered in Section 5. The second section describes the techniques employed to derive explicit solutions to the relevant problems in the benchmark setting. The third section presents estimates of the welfare gains that demand response policies might secure in settings that re ‡ect conditions in the California and the ISO New England regions.
Analytic Conclusions for the Benchmark Setting.
In the benchmark setting analyzed in Section 5, for any given , consumer i chooses x u i to maximize:
Therefore, at an interior optimum:
so the amount of electricity consumer i purchases from the utility is:
(63) (62) implies that consumer i will be indi¤erent between providing demand response and consuming his baseline level of consumption, x i , when = e i , where: Brown and Sappington (2015) demonstrate that e i 2 [ ; ] will be unique and i = ( e i ; ]
(so individual i provides DR only for 2 ( e i ; ]) if b is su¢ ciently large (so the utility's marginal cost of production increases su¢ ciently rapidly with output) and V i is su¢ ciently large for all i (which ensures that each consumer's valuation of electricity is strictly positive).
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First consider the setting where there is no demand response program. The regulator's problem in this setting, [RP-n] , is to choose f R; r g to maximize expected consumer welfare while ensuring the utility secures non-negative expected pro…t.
Lemma B1. At the solution to [RP-n]:
Proof. Let n 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the utility's participation constraint. Then the Lagrangian function associated with [RP-n] is:
Since the value of R does not a¤ect consumption decisions, di¤erentiating (67) with respect to R, using (1) and (3) (with m( ) = 0 for all ), provides N + n N = 0 )
Since C (X) = a X + b X 2 , (68) implies:
Because n = 1, (71) can be written as:
(65) follows from (63), (68), (69), (70), and (72).
Since n > 0, (3) implies: 
Proof. The proof follows directly from (63), (64), (68), (69), (70), and Proposition 1.
Now consider the regulator's problem of choosing f R; r g to maximize expected consumer welfare in the benchmark setting while ensuring the utility secures non-negative expected pro…t when the unit compensation for demand response is set equal to the utility's prevailing marginal cost of supplying electricity, i.e., m( ) = C 
Proof. (77) follows immediately from the assumptions that C(X) = a X +b X 2 and m( ) = C 0 (X u ) for all 2 [ ; ]. The proof of (78) parallels the proof of (7).
As in the proof of Proposition 1, it is readily veri…ed that the utility's participation constraint binds at the solution to [RP-F] . Therefore, from (63):
(79) follows immediately from (80).
Numerical Solution Techniques.
We now brie ‡y describe the techniques employed to derive explicit solutions to problems First, the Newton-Raphson's Iteration Method ("Newton's Method") was employed to solve (65) and (66) for the values of r and R that the regulator will implement in the absence of any DR policy. These values, in turn, were employed to identify x L and x H , the baseline consumption levels for the two consumer types.
Second, employing the identi…ed values for x L and x H , Newton's method was employed to solve (74) and (75) for the values of r and m( ) (and thus e L and e H ) at the solution to [RP-E] . Gaussian Quadrature Numerical Integration was employed to perform integration over the density function g( ), which was estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
Third, (76) was solved to identify the value of R at the solution to [RP-E] . Quasi-Monte Carlo Integration (Owen, 2009 ) was employed to perform integration over the m( ) function that is de…ned implicitly in (74).
Fourth, corresponding techniques were employed to solve (77), (78), and (79) Finally, numerical integration was employed to calculate the relevant expected values of welfare, DR compensation, and peak-load production costs.
Estimated Outcomes in Additional Settings.
We now present estimates of the welfare gains that demand response (DR) policies can produce in two additional settings: the CA benchmark setting and the NE benchmark setting.
These settings parallel the benchmark setting analyzed in Section 5, except that relevant parameter values are modi…ed to re ‡ect conditions in the California and the ISO New England regions. Five primary modi…cations are implemented.
First, the cost parameters a and b re ‡ect Bushnell's (2007) estimates for the the two regions. Second, the minimum ( ), maximum ( ), shape (h), and scale ( ) parameters of the (gamma) distribution re ‡ect 2013 temperature data speci…c to each of the two regions. 50 Fifth, F is set at 46% of the revenue collected from ratepayers in 48 The region-speci…c temperature data are drawn from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2014). 49 Region-speci…c load data are derived from EIA (2014c). 50 These region-speci…c data are derived from EIA (2014a). 42 the relevant regions in 2013.
51 Table B1 Tables B2 and B3 present the outcomes corresponding to the outcomes reported in Table   1 for the CA benchmark setting and the NE benchmark setting, respectively. 52 51 Revenue in a region is calculated as the product of the average retail rate for electricity and the total load in the region (EIA, 2014b,c). 52 Recall that EfC P ( )g is the utility's expected production cost in states 2 [ m ; ], where m is the smallest realization of for which strictly positive demand response arises both at the solution to [RP] and under the optimal FERC policy. m = 31:2 in the California benchmark setting. m = 34:2 in the NE benchmark setting. Table B3 . Outcomes in the NE Benchmark Setting. Tables B2 and B3 indicate that the optimal DR policy increases expected welfare above the level achieved in the absence of any DR policy by 24:5% in the California benchmark setting and by 30:0% in the NE benchmark setting. These percentage gains exceed the corresponding gain in the (PJM) benchmark setting analyzed in Section 5. The more pronounced gains re ‡ect in part the utility's more steeply sloped marginal cost function (i.e., the larger values of a and b) in the California and the NE benchmark settings.
